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SUMMARY
The SIFT experimentalcomputersystemwas designedto meet extremely
• high reliabilityrequirementsand to facilitatea formal proof of its
correctness. These severe designconstraintshave impactedthe user-
interfacein severalways. The system providesthe user with static,
nonpreemptiveschedulingand requiresthat all tasks executein lessthan
3 milliseconds. A tedious generationof vote and scheduletables is
requiredof the user to coordinatethe redundancymanagementcapabilitiesof
the SIFT systemwith his applicationworkload. The characteristicsof this
user interfaceand its impacton applicationsystemdesign are assessed in
this paper.
INTRODUCTION
The SIFT computer system developed by SRI International for NASA
LangleyResearch Center is an experimental Computer designed to support the
flight controls of a relaxed static stability aircraft. Because the _ight
control functions are crucial in such aircraft, the reliability requirement
for SIFT is a probability of failure not to exceed 10-9 for a lO-hour
flight. The SIFT computer exploits an innovative approach to fault
tolerance utilizing software controlled task replication and
reconfiguration. The design of SIFT produced a new distributed clock
synchronization algorithm and an interactive consistency algorithm of
generic significance. Furthermore, the development of SIFT, using a formal
proof methodology, has demonstrated the feasibility of such techniques on a
nontrivial system-level problem.
The fault-tolerant characteristics of SIFT have been discussed in
detail in the literature (refs. I, 2, and 3); however_ the application level
capabilities have not been openly discussed. This paper will consider the
SIFT system as it appears to the application user. Although the details of
the user interface are not of concern, the capabilities which are inherently
limited by the underlying redundancy management system are of much
interest. Such limitations will be explored in this paper. Furthermore,
this paper will describe the current state of the SIFT system which, after
several major changes, is a system of less power and flexibility than the
system described in the 1978 IEEE paper (ref. I).
BASlC CHARACTERISTICSOF SIFT
The SIFT hardware consists of a set of Bendix BDX930avionics computers
fully interconnected by a serial, point-to-point broadcast network. Up to
8 processors may be included in the configuration. Each processor has 32K
words of 16-bit memory and an instruction speed of approximately I million
instructions per second. Two blocks of memory (1024 words each) are
allocated for interprocessor communication. One of these blocks, called the
"transaction file" is used to control the output information of a
processor. The other block, the "datafile," is partitioned into 8 sections
of 128 words each. One of these sections holds the output variables which
are to be broadcast to the other processors. The seven remaining sections
serve as "mailboxes" to receive information from the other processors in the
system. The SIFT processors also contain a MIL STD 1553A bus interface for o
communications with the other aircraft systems.
The fundamentalcoordinationof the SIFT system is accomplishedthrough
the use of a clock synchronizationalgorithm. Each processorcontainsits
o own real-timeclock which must be synchronizedwith the other clocks in the
system. Each clock in the system "corrects"itselfrelative to all other
clocks in thesystem through use of a periodicbroadcasttechnique. SRI has
demonstratedthat with a set of four or more processors,their synchroni-
zation algorithmwill insurethat the clockswill remain synchronizedto
within 50 microseconds,even in the presenceof an arbitraryfailureof one
clock (ref. 2). Previouslydevelopedalgorithmswere found to be incapable
of maintainingsynchronization in the presenceof a maliciouslying clock
(i.e. a clock that broadcastsdifferentvalues to differentclocks). The
developmentof the SIFT synchronizationalgorithmis a significant
accomplishmentby the SRI team.
The basic mechanismOf fault tolerancein SIFT is task replicationand
voting. "Severalreplicates(i.e. identicalcopies of a task) areassigned
to differentprocessorsin the SIFT configuration. Each replicatereceives
identicalinput and performsidenticalcomputations. The outputsof these
replicatesare "voted"to preventpropagationof hardwarefaults and to
detect the failed processor. The vote discrepanciesare noted by the
executivesystem and later used to reconfigurethe failed processorout of
the working set of processors. Variousdegrees of reliabilitycan be
obtainedfor each task by using differentamountsof task replicationon
differentprocessors. The coordinationof task replicationand voting is
o accomplishedthroughuse of precalculatedscheduleand vote tables in each
processor. Since task replicatesonthe variousprocessorsare controlled
by scheduletableswhich are synchronized,all replicatesreceivethe same
data. Furthermore,through use of an "interactiveconsistencyalgorithm,"
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developedby SRI, single source inputdata can be accommodatedin the
system (ref.4). Withoutthe algorithm_,a failed processor,transferring
single sourcedata to the task replicates,could send differentvalues to
-:
each replicate. This, in turn, could lead to the eliminationof good
processorsfrom the system. The recognitionand solutionof this problem
representsanothersignificantachievementof the SRI team.
The SIFT operatingsystem was designed so that a formalmathematical
proof-of-correctnessof the operatingsystemcould be made. This approach
has had significantimpacton the system structureand its capabilities.
Becauseof the inherentcomplexityof the formal proof process,the system
design has been kept extremelysimple. The SIFT proof-of-correctnesshas
demonstratedthat formaltechniquesare applicableto system-levelproblems
of much greatersize and complexitythan the problemsfound in most research
paperson this subject. However,in many ways, this approachhas resulted
in a SIFT syst_emof less power and flexibilitythan otherwisewould have
been possible. (See table 1.) In particular,a major simplificationin the
schedulingand voting strategiesbecame necessaryin order to formallyprove
the systemcorrect. A priority-drivenpreemptiveschedulerwould have
introducedunrestrictedconcurrency- the logicallysimultaneousexecution
of severaltasks - intothe system. The problemof provinga system of
cooperatingconcurrentprocessesis still an open question,though progress
has been made since the design of SIFT. Future generationsof SIFT-like
fault-tolerantsystemsmay be able to incorporatethe flexibilitiesand -
poIverof concurrencythrough priority-basedschedulersas the formal
verificationtechnologyadvances. Nevertheless,the SIFT computer
representsan importantstep in the evolutionof formallyverifiable
fault-tolerant systems.
TABLE I. - A COMPARISONOF SIFT TODAYWITH THE
1978 IEEE PAPERDESCRIPTION
IEEE Paper SIFT Today
" Priority based periodic scheduling Static preplanned scheduling
( preempt i ve) (nonpr eempt i ve)
Arbitrary task length All tasks must fit in a
subframe time slot
Dynamic allocation of tasks to processors Static assignment of tasks to
proces sors
Task replication is transparent to the The application designer must
application designer build schedule tables and
statically assign task
replicates to processors
Voting is transparent to the application The application designer must
designer through use of operating system build a vote table which
routines to obtain interprocess data corresponds to the
precalculated schedule table
THE APPLICATIONDESIGNERINTERFACETO SIFT
The SIFT operating system provides an interface to the applications
designer which is significantly different • from traditional real-time
systems. The most striking feature of the SIFT system from the user's
perspective is the requirement that all tasks must execute in less than
3 milliseconds. The reason for this restriction is that the voting
algorithm in SIFT is based on a static schedule table and a vote table which
consist of 3 millisecond time slots for the tasks. The schedule table !
determines the set of tasks and their order of execution on a SIFT
• processor. Since aircraft guidance and control functions consist of
periodic sensor sampling, transfer function computations and actuator
command generation,this scheduletable is executed repetitively.•Functions
with higher iterationrate requirementscan ap_ar more than once in the
scheduletable. Functionswith lower rate requirementscan use a flag to _
cause alternateskippingof a particulartask. The scheduletable corre-
spondsto one major frame which consistsof 30 subframes. Each task is
staticallyassignedto one or more subframesand if a functionrequiresmore
than 3 millisecondsto execute,it must be subdividedinto 2 or more tasks.
(See figure 1. - FunctionG, for example,has been subdividedinto tasks G
and G' and has been replicatedon processors4, 5 and 6). The creationof
the static scheduletable is the responsibilityof the applicationdesigner.
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The tasks must be ordered according to their functional dependencies and
structure the schedule table accordingly. However this is only a small
part of the initialization which must be done. SIFT is designed to support
task replication - identical tasks executing on different computers in the
SIFT network - and is capable of reconfiguration. The applications designer
must allocate the task replicates to the various processors to meet various
reliability requirements. Sometasks may require 5 replicates, whereas
others require only I or 3.
As long as there are no precedence constraints on the execution of the
tasks (i.e., a particular ordering of tasks is not required), this is not an
intractable problem. However, if precedence constraints exist, then the
resulting "scheduling" problem can be very complex. Even ignoring theneed
to synchronize the task replicates, the complexity of finding an optimal
schedule is NP-complete when 3 or more processors are to be scheduled (ref.
5). Furthermore, it is inevitable that precedence constraints will be
present Since the partition of a function (longer than 3 ms) into tasks
generates a sequence of tasks which must be executed sequentially.
(Although optimal schedules may not be necessary, this illustrates that
generating such schedules is not trivial - especially good ones.) The
reconfiguration capability of SIFT also increases the workload of the
application designer. One table must he generated for every processor for
• every configuration (i.e., as processors fail and are removed we have a
6-processor configuration, then a 5-processor configuration, then a
4-processor configuration, etc.). If there are n processors in the system
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initially,the user must generate n + (n-l)+ (n-2)+.o.+ 2 tables or(n2 +
n-2)/2tables. For the presentSIFT configurationof 6 processors,
20 differentscheduletablesmust be generated."
The SIFT processorachievesits fault tolerancefrom the voting of the
task replicates. Whenever a task producesoutput data it must be voted.
This is not transparentto the applicationdesigner. The application
designermust enter the index of the output data in a "vote" table which
must be generatedfor each systemconfiguration. Hence, the designermust
generateanothern-1 vote tables for an n-processorSIFT. The total number
of vote and scheduletables which must be createdby the application
designer on an n-processorSIFT is thus (n2 + 3n - 4)/2 or 25 for a
6-processorsystem.
It shouldbe noted that the proof of correctnessof the SIFT system does
not cover the applicationdomain. The proof demonstratesthat SIFT
correctlymasks and reconfiguressinglefaults out of the system and will
scheduletasks accordingto the user generatedtables. The abilityof the
system to mask and isolatefaults,however, is dependentupon the inclusion
of the necessaryintertaskvariablesin the vote table. If an error is made
in the scheduletables or vote tables,system failure is possible.
Therefore,a reliableapplicationsystemof SIFT requiresa systematicand
reliable approachto the generationof scheduleand vote tables. Clearly,
such a systematicapproachmust also use formal proof-of-correctness
techniquessince the entriesof the vote table and scheduletables depend on
the interactionof the applicationtasks (e.g.,the presenceor absenceof
entries in the vote table dependson l_,_atinformationmust be sent from one
task to anotherand this is determinedby the formallyspecifiedfunctions
J
these tasks must perform).
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ANALYSIS OF SIFT CAPABILITIES
The primaryconstrainton the flexibilityof the SIFT system is the
• nonpreemptive,unit-executiontime schedulingphilosophy. The advantagesof
problemdecompositionand modularityhave been widely discussedin the
literature(refs.6, 7,and 8), yet an artificialexecutiontime constraint
can only serve to complicatethe systemstructure. To enhance program
simplicityand reliability,the partitionmust be made on the basis of
functionalutility,not because of an arbitrarysizing constraint. This
unit-executionconstraintwill cause the introductionof inefficientmodule
interfacesand a consequentincreasein intertaskcommunicationvariables.
This compoundsanotherallocationproblemin SIFT--themapping of intertask
variablesto the 128 data file locations. If more than 128 intertask
variablesare needed,they must be "multiplexed"in time by the application
user. This time-multiplexedallocationof intertaskvariables,however,
would have to be carefullycoordinatedwith the processor'stask schedule.
The nonpreemptivecharacteristicof the SIFT schedulerlimitsthe
performanceand flexibilityof the system. A preemptiveschedulerwould
offer severaladvantagesover a nonpreemptivescheduler:
1) rap'idresponseto asynchronousevents (cf. in a nonpreemptivesystem
a task must be continuallydispatchedwhich "polls"an event
repetitively)(ref.9);
2) more effectiveCPU utilization(i.e.a preemptiveschedulecan
always be constructedwhich is shorteror equal to a nonpreemptive
schedulewhen the number of processors> 2) (ref.lO);
3) accommodationof transientsystem overloadsof crucialfunctionsby
not _ispatchinglow-prioritytasks (ref. 11);
4) supportof arbitraryiterationrates for the tasks (cf. in a static
table nonpreemptiveschedule,all iterationrates must be multiples
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of a base rate; hence, tasks sometimesmust be scheduledto run at a i.;_
higher rate than the function requires)(refs. 11 and 12); and
5) supportof periodictask sets vdth up to 100 percent processor .....
utilizationwhile still guaranteeingthat al! real-timedeadlines
will be met on a single processor(ref. 12). o
Anotherconsequenceof the nonpreemptiveschedulerof SIFT is that
support for high-levellanguageswith flexibleconcurrentprocessing
capabilitiessuch as Ada or ConcurrentPascal is not possible. The
flexibilitiesof the preemptiveapproachlisted above are incorporatedinto
these languages. The unit executionrestrictionon task lengthfurther
aggravatesthis problem. Furthermore,task replicationshould be
transparentat the applicationlanguagelevel. But since asynchronous
communicationis possible in these languagesand SIFT's replicatesare
controlledby static vote tables,the mappingto SIFT is impossible.
A LOOK TOWARDS THE NEXT GENERATIONAIRCRAFTCONTROLSYSTEMS ........
The traditionalapproachto the developmentof an aircraft electronics
system has been to partitionthe system functionsand to design each
independently(e.g., into flight controls,navigation,guidance,etc.).
Often these functionsare assignedto differentcomputers. These functions
are implementedas a set of tasks scheduledon the computersby a
nonpreemptivecyclic executivewith a predeterminedexecutionsequence,
where each cycle is initiated by a clock interrupt and every task is run to
completion. In such a federated system approach, the SIFT computer could
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supportthe flight criticalfunctionssuch as stabilityaugmentationand
flutter-modesuppressionin a relaxedstatic stabilityaircraft.
° The new techniquesof modern controltheory,researchfor advanced
aerodynamicconcepts,and functionalintegrationresearchare revealing
significantbenefitsto be obtainedfrom an integratedsystem approach
(refs.13). Throughthe integrationof traditionallyseparatefunctions,
higher aircraftperformanceis promised,but this will come at the cost of
increasedlogicalcomplexityand an increasedcomputationalworkload.
Capabilitiesexceedingthe nonpreemptivecyclic executiveapproachwill be
needed to cope with the high degree of functionalinteractionand to provide
rapid responseto asynchronouseventssuch as pilot commandsand failed
sensorsor actuators. Also, the nonpreemptive,cyclic executivewill be
undesirablesince it impactsthe applicationsystemdesign in several
adverseways:
1) The static natureof the task schedulecauses a proliferationof
discrete (Boolean)variablesin order that the tasks can be
responsiveto changes in flight phase and other asynchronous
events. The availabilityof dynamic schedulingenablesthe
designerto build tasks tailoredto a single flight phase which are
only dispatchedwhen needed.
2) The additionof new low prioritytasks necessitatesa redesignof
the static scheduletable (ref. 9).
3) Task executionlengthvariabilityresultsin inefficient
" utilizationof the CPU since the schedulesmust be built for
worst-caseexecutiontimes. The proliferationof discrete
variablesas describedabove furthercompoundsthis problem
(refo 11)o
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Becauseof the inefficienciesand inflexibilityof thetask management
approachpresentedabove, the next generationaircraft systemswill need the
capabilitiesof a priority-drivenpreemptiveapproach(ref. 14).
Furthermore,the softwareengineeringmethodologiesare alreadyextolling
the virtuesof high-levellanguageswith concurrentprocessingcapabilities
(e.g.,Ada) (ref. 15). These languagesprovideadditionalsafety through
detectionat compiletime of many time-dependenterrors which are
traditionallyextremelyhard to discoverthroughtestin9alone. It appears
to be desirablethat the fault-handlingsystemsof future fault-tolerant
architecturesbe compatiblewith these high-levellanguages. It is
important,therefore,that the future generationsof SIFT-likearchitectures
have capabilitiesbeyondthose of SIFT today. If this flexibilityis
unobtainablethen future aircraft systemdesignersare going to be limited
in many ways.
CONCLUSIONS
The development of the SIFT computer system represents a major
accomplishment in fault-tolerant systems technology. However, the high
reliability requirements and the use of formal proof techniques have
restricted the capabilities of the system in several ways and have placed
severe demands on the application designer using the system. In particular,
the requirements that the application designer must partition all functions
into 3 millisecond tasks and manually delineate task replication,
scheduling, voting, and reconfiguration are especially severe. Perhaps .
future generations of SIFT will be able to bring the redundancy management
functions totally under the control of the operating system and present a
s,
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°°,
user-friendlyinterfaceto the applicationsdesigner. Thisundoubtedlywi.ll
only come through major improvements in the software techniques used to
o accommodatehardwarefailures. If such improvementsare unattainable,the
users of SIFT-like computers will face new obstacles in the implementations
of their applicationsystems.
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